Environmental regulation, innovation quality and firms’ competitivity-Quasi-natural experiment based on China’s carbon emissions trading pilot by Jiangfeng Hu et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
Environmental regulation, innovation quality and
firms’ competitivity―Quasi-natural experiment
based on China’s carbon emissions trading pilot
Jiangfeng Hu, Qinghua Huang & Xiding Chen
To cite this article: Jiangfeng Hu, Qinghua Huang & Xiding Chen (2020) Environmental regulation,
innovation quality and firms’ competitivity―Quasi-natural experiment based on China’s carbon
emissions trading pilot, Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 33:1, 3307-3333, DOI:
10.1080/1331677X.2020.1771745
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2020.1771745
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 24 Aug 2020.
Submit your article to this journal Article views: 873
View related articles View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles 
Environmental regulation, innovation quality and firms’
competitivity-Quasi-natural experiment based on China’s
carbon emissions trading pilot
Jiangfeng Hua, Qinghua Huanga and Xiding Chenb
aCollege of Economics & Management, Southwest University, Chongqing, China; bSchool of Finance,
Wenzhou Business College, Wenzhou, Zhejiang, China
ABSTRACT
In the study of the “Porter Hypothesis”, scholars explored the
impact of different forms of innovation on the firms’ competitiv-
ity, but did not distinguish between innovations on the difference
in patent quality. In addition, relevant research only regards
innovation as a mediator between environmental regulation and
competitivity, and doesn’t take into account innovation induced
by environmental regulation, can only promote competitivity
under the constraints of environmental regulation. That is to say,
environmental regulation not only induces innovation, but also
moderates innovation to promote competitivity. In view of this,
we use panel data of A-share listed firms in China from 2006 to
2016, and adopt propensity score matching and different in differ-
ent (PSM-DID) model to empirically test the inductive effect and
moderating effect. The results show that CETS cannot only
improve the quantity and quality, but also significantly enhance
the firms’ market value; innovation itself cannot enhance the
firms’ market value, but the interaction with CETS can promote
the firms’ market value. In addition, the CETS has a stronger
inductive effect on innovation of state-owned shares firms, but
the positive moderating effect on high-quality innovation and
competitivity only exists in non-state-owned shares firms.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, in order to cope with global warming, the Chinese government has
actively assumed the responsibility for major powers. In June 2013, seven CETS pilots
were launched in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Guangdong, Shenzhen and
Hubei. At the same time, it is also clearly stated in the “13th Five-Year Plan” that by
2020, the carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP will be 40%-45% lower than that
of 2005, and the target of achieving peak CO2 emissions by 2030 is expected
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(Tollefson, 2016; Weng et al., 2018). It is foreseeable that a low-carbon economy will
become an inevitable trend for the sustainable development of China’s economy in
the future. However, China is also facing many “challenges” in the “opportunities” of
low-carbon sustainable development. According to the World Energy Statistics
Yearbook 2017, China’s primary energy consumption of 2016 is 4.36 billion tons of
standard coal, of which coal accounts for 62%. Compared with the peak of 76% in
2008, although it has decreased, it also means that the energy consumption structure
dominated by coal is still difficult to change fundamentally in the short term (Zhang
et al., 2017). Moreover, with the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization in
China, the total energy consumption will increase at an average annual rate of 2.5%
in the future. Therefore, under the dual pressures of energy structure being difficult
to optimize in the short term and energy consumption increasing continuously,
whether and how to coordinate the dual objectives of greenhouse gas emission miti-
gation and economic development. It has become an important issue to be solved
urgently by the Chinese government and academia.
According to Porter and Linde (1995), reasonable environmental regulation can
stimulate firms’ technological innovation, and make up for compliance costs by
means of energy saving and product quality improvement brought by technological
innovation, in order to improve environmental quality while promoting the firms’
competitivity, namely the so-called “Porter Hypothesis”. It can be seen that the real-
ization of win-win economic and environmental depends to a large extent on whether
the CETS can promote technological innovation and adoption. However, in the exist-
ing empirical research on the “Porter Hypothesis”, scholars mostly affirmed the role
of environmental regulation to stimulate firm innovation, but there is a big contro-
versy about whether environmental regulation can effectively improve firm perform-
ance or competitivity (Hille & M€obius, 2019; Yuan et al., 2017; Zhao & Sun, 2016).
Even in some studies, technological innovations caused by environmental regulations
are not supported to bring about an increase in firm performance or competitivity
(Ambec et al., 2013; Gilli et al., 2014; Rexh€auser & Rammer, 2014). This is because,
in strict environmental regulations, firms have to invest the elements (labor and cap-
ital) that were originally used for productive activities in non-productive activities to
reduce pollution emissions (Ambec et al., 2013; Gray & Shadbegian, 1998). Although
this process contributes to the creation and use of new technologies (Ghosal et al.,
2014; Nesta et al., 2014), but because the firm innovation strategy is not consistent, it
will choose different forms of technological innovation. And the difference in the
form of technological innovation will ultimately be reflected in the difference in the
compensation for the cost of the regulation (Hu et al., 2017; Porter & Linde, 1995). If
the performance of the technology innovation chosen by the firm cannot make up
the cost, then it will still cause loss of competitivity (Rexh€auser & Rammer, 2014).
Therefore, it can be said that the existence of the “Porter Hypothesis” depends largely
on which form of technological innovation the firm chooses.
Considering that China has experienced explosive growth in the number of inno-
vations characterized by patents in recent years, there is still a big gap in terms of the
innovation quality compared with developed countries in Europe and America (Hu
et al., 2017). Therefore, this paper divides firm innovation into innovation quantity
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and innovation quality based on patent characteristics. It is generally believed that the
higher the firms innovation quality, the more obvious its competitive advantage in
the market (Hall et al., 2005; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004). But in reality, some
firms tend to apply for a large number of invalid patents for low-quality innovation
due to strategic competition (Thoma, 2013). Especially in the absence of major
changes in the market environment, if the technological innovation of the firm is too
advanced, it will not be recognized by the market, but also the loss of competitivity
due to waste of resources (Hsieh, 2013). Then, at the time of China’s low-carbon eco-
nomic transformation, the CETS, as an external pressure imposed by the government
on technological innovation, can induce firms to turn to high-quality innovation?
And can this kind of innovative strategy conversion be recognized by the market,
which will help the firm to improve its competitivity?
Compared with the existing literature, the possible marginal contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows. (1) on the identification of innovation. In this
paper, the innovation level is measured by the innovation quantity and the innovation
quality. The patent application count is used as the innovation quantity, and the inven-
tion patent application, utility model patent application and design patent application
represent the from high to low innovation quality. On this basis, this paper also meas-
ures the value dimension of innovation quality by regression of firm’s market value to
patent. (2) on the types of environmental regulation. This paper takes China’s carbon
emission trading pilot policy as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the impact of the
CETS on the quality of Chinese firms’ innovation. (3) In the empirical strategy. This
paper not only examines the inductive effect of CETS on firm technology innovation
and the mediating effect of technological innovation on CETS and firm competitivity,
but also examines the regulatory effect of CETS on technological innovation and firm
competitivity. (4) in terms of data and methods. We use the 2006-2016 China A-share
listed firms data as a research sample. In addition, we first use Prosperity score match-
ing (PSM) to match the samples, and then use different in different (DID) model to
regress the matched sub-sample, namely PSM-DID model. The reason is mainly from
two aspects. On the one hand, it avoids the result bias of the model endogeneity. On
the other hand, it overcomes the defect that the “treatment group” and the “control
group” have common trend assumptions in the ordinary DID model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the develop-
ment history of CETS and the development status of China’s CETS, and introduces the
existing research on “porter hypothesis”, then deduces the research hypothesis of this
paper. Section 3 introduces research methods and model setting. Section 4 introduces
the data and variable. Section 5 presents empirical results. In section 6, we provide het-
erogeneity test and robustness test. Finally, the discussion and conclusion in section 7.
2. Institutional background and theoretical framework
2.1. Institutional background
Since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in October 1997, the new concept of achiev-
ing greenhouse gas emission reduction through market mechanisms has been con-
tinuously developed (Weng et al., 2018). Especially in the period of 2002-2005, the
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United Kingdom, Australia and the European Union have established carbon trading
markets, marking the realization of carbon trading from concept to practice. The so-
called carbon emissions trading refers to the fact that the firm buys (sells) additional
(excess) carbon emission rights in the market based on its own carbon emission
allowance based on the government’s total carbon emissions. It is generally believed
that the nature of the products that give carbon emission rights will have an impact
on the production decisions of firms (Zhang et al., 2017). In addition, carbon trading
not only has higher emission reduction efficiency than traditional command-and-con-
trol emission reduction tools, but also can optimize energy structure through price
transmission mechanisms (Fang et al., 2018). At present, the EU’s emissions system,
the world’s largest multi-country CETS, covers 24 countries and more than 12,000
industrial firms (Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2016), contributing about 80% of the world’s
trading volume to 490 million euros (Keohane et al., 2017). Other carbon trading
markets, such as California, Tokyo, New Zealand and South Korea, are regional
CETS that aim to achieve experience for the effective docking with other CETS to
form a global unified CETS through the operation of the regional or national CETS.
Recently, China is also actively exploring the establishment of a domestic CETS to
achieve a market-oriented environmental regulation of greenhouse gas emission
reduction. There are two reasons, on the one hand, low-carbon development has
become a global inevitable trend, and financial innovations derived from carbon
exchanges are considered to be new economic growth points in the future (Song
et al., 2018). On the other hand, possessing the largest carbon resources in the world,
China undoubtedly is the main subject in the international carbon market (Liu et al.,
2015). However, China finds itself in an awkward and passive position when entering
this market due to the lack of a multi-level carbon trading market with price discov-
ery and resource allocation functions. So as to many Carbon Certified Emission
Reductions sold to developed countries at low prices are packaged into high-end car-
bon financial products and resold for more profit, resulting in the loss of carbon
assets (Zhang et al., 2017). In October 2011, the National Development and Reform
Commission of China issued the “Notice on Launching Pilot Work on CETS Rights”,
officially approving carbon trading pilots in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing,
Hubei, Guangdong and Shenzhen, and launched carbon emissions trading in these
seven provinces and cities in 2013. Among them, the industries constrained by car-
bon emissions are mainly eight high-carbon industries such as steel, electric power,
chemical, construction, paper, non-ferrous metals and aviation (Wang & Lin, 2016;
Xu et al., 2016). As of December 2016, the volume of carbon dioxide in seven carbon
trading pilots reached 160 million tons, with a turnover of nearly 2.5 billion yuan
(Weng et al., 2018). Although the size of carbon trading in China’s pilot provinces
and cities is smaller than that of EU emissions trading, it is growing rapidly.
Especially in December 2017, with the issuance of the National Carbon Emissions
Trading Market Construction Plan (Power Generation Industry), it means that the
establishment of a national CETS with the power generation industry as a break-
through will be fully launched. By then, China’s carbon trading market will reach 4
billion tons, twice the European carbon trading market, and is expected to become
the world’s largest CETS (Weng et al., 2018).
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2.2. Theoretical framework and research hypothesis
At present, the research on the “Porter Hypothesis” has emerged in large numbers.
This paper will sort out and interpret the existing literature from the relationship
between environmental regulation and the relationship between firm innovation qual-
ity, innovation quality and firm competitiveness, and derive the research hypothesis.
2.2.1. Induced effect of environmental regulation
Since Porter and Linde (1995) pioneered the “Porter Hypothesis”, that is, strict envir-
onmental regulation can induce firms to carry out technological innovation, in order
to make up for the “cost of compliance”, but also to enhance the competitivity of
firms. Since then, a lot of confirmatory research on the “Porter Hypothesis” has
emerged. Although there is controversy over whether strict environmental regulation
can enhance the competitivity of firms, it is more consistent that most studies show
that reasonable environmental regulation does induce technological innovation in
firms. However, with the deepening of research, scholars have classified the techno-
logical innovation more carefully, and found that environmental regulation does not
promote all types of innovation, but has a biased induction. In other words, environ-
mental regulation has changed the firm’s original innovation strategy. Some scholars
have divided the technology into pollution-based technology and clean-type technol-
ogy based on the influence of technology on environmental quality. It has been veri-
fied theoretically and empirically that strict environmental regulation can indeed
induce firms to shift from pollution-based technological innovation to clean techno-
logical innovation (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Johnstone et al., 2017; Rubashkina et al.,
2015). In addition, some scholars have divided technological innovation into process
innovation and product innovation. They believe that environmental regulation has a
significant effect on both types of innovation, but relatively speaking, the impact on
firm process innovation is more powerful (Guo et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2017; Triguero
et al., 2013). Considering that China has achieved explosive growth in the number of
patent-based innovations, there is still a big gap in terms of the innovation quality
compared to developed countries in Europe and America (Hu et al., 2017). Based on
the patent characteristics, this paper divides firm’s innovation into innovation quan-
tity and innovation quality, which undoubtedly conforms to the problem that innov-
ation quality lags behind innovation quantity in China.
In addition, Existing literature indicates that the choice of environmental regula-
tion tools is also a key factor affecting firm innovation strategies (Bergek & Berggren,
2014). It is generally believed that market-based environmental regulation tools give
firms greater flexibility in pollution reduction and thus more incentives for techno-
logical innovation than command-and-control environmental regulation tools
(Johnstone et al., 2017; Ren et al., 2018; Tang, 2015). Anderson et al. (2010) found
through questionnaires that nearly half of the firms in the CETS have updated their
existing production facilities, and most of them have optimized their production
processes. Similarly, Borghesi et al. (2015) based on Italian data also shows that the
CETS can significantly promote firm green technology innovation. At the same time,
however, some scholars have found that the European CETS has only a 2% improve-
ment in firm low-carbon patent behavior, indicating that the green innovation effect
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of environmental regulation has an exaggerated component (Calel & Dechezleprêtre,
2016). Bel and Joseph (2018) explained this that the lack of supply of carbon trading
quotas in the EU caused the carbon price to be low, which would not restrict the
production behavior of firms, and ultimately it was not conducive to firms to adopt
low-carbon technology. Although China’s CETS is still in its infancy, and the carbon
trading quota and carbon rights pricing mechanism need to be improved, in view of
China’s previous experience in the operation of the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), and the carbon emissions trading pilots are selected in economically devel-
oped regions, which are certain degree of comparability with European countries.
Therefore, the hypothesis H1 of this paper is proposed:
H1: The CETS not only promotes the increase in the number of firm innovations, but
also induces firms to turn to high-quality innovation.
2.2.2. Moderated effect of environmental regulation
Patents as “successful” innovations Hall et al. (2005) are often used to measure the
innovation quality or technology (Kim et al., 2018). However, due to data availability
and the diversity of patent features, different studies have used different characteris-
tics of patents to measure the innovation quality. It is more common to use patent
citations to measure the quality of Chinese innovation (Boeing & Mueller, 2016;
Rong et al., 2017), but the problem is that patents that are applied earlier may have
more citations than patents that are applied late, and are likely to have nothing to do
with the innovation quality. To solve this problem, Fisch et al. (2017) used the time
span of patents from the time of application to the first time to evaluate the quality
of patents. In addition, considering that a single indicator is difficult to fully reflect
the innovation quality, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), Schettino et al. (2013) use
principal component analysis to construct a comprehensive index representing the
innovation quality by using the four patent characteristics of the same family, such as
patent size, patent application scope, forward and backward patent citation. However,
no matter what indicators and methods are used, the conclusions are that the quality
of Chinese patents is lower than other countries.
At the same time, some scholars have emphasized that intellectual property rights
(IPR) not only is a major driver of technological competitivity and sustainable busi-
ness operation, but also enables firms to generate additional considerable profit
(Fisch et al., 2017; Hsieh, 2013). That is to say, innovation quality includes two
dimensions of technology and value, and there is a significant positive correlation
between these two dimensions (Hall et al., 2005; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004).
However, some scholars have pointed out that due to the existence of market failures,
high-quality innovation may not necessarily bring high returns to firms (Lanjouw &
Schankerman, 2004). Especially in the absence of major changes in the market envir-
onment, if the technological innovation of the firm is too advanced, it will not be rec-
ognized by the market, but also the loss of competitivity due to waste of resources
(Hsieh, 2013), in other words, high quality innovation is not automatically recognized
by the market. Therefore, the research hypothesis H2 of this paper is proposed:
H2: The impact of high-quality innovation on firm competitivity is uncertain, either
positive or negative.
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At present, as the Chinese economy has changed from a past extensive develop-
ment model to a critical period of emphasis on development quality, development
concepts such as “ecological civilization construction”, “green development” and
“high quality development” have also appeared in the Chinese government work
report and in the “13th Five-Year Plan”. This also shows that China’s market envir-
onment is undergoing tremendous changes. Moreover, with the deepening of the aca-
demic research on the “Porter Hypothesis”, more and more evidence shows that
under strict environmental regulations, although technological innovations measured
by comprehensive indicators have not significantly promoted the market value or
competitivity of firms, they have even negative effects (Hille & M€obius, 2019; Zhao &
Sun, 2016). However, in the empirical study of rigorous classification of technological
innovation, different types of technological innovations have exerted different innov-
ation compensation effects on “following costs” (Hu et al., 2017), resulting in green
technologies induced by environmental regulation. The conclusion that there is a
positive relationship between innovation and the market value or competitivity of the
firm (Yuan & Xiang, 2018). Combined with the theoretical analysis of the relationship
between environmental regulation and innovation quality, it also means that environ-
mental regulation can accelerate the recognition of high-quality innovations by the
market, enabling firms to gain market power and thus bring excess profits to firms.
Finally, the hypothesis H3 of this paper is proposed:
H3: The CETS plays a positive role in moderating innovation quality and competitivity,
and can accelerate the recognition of high-quality innovation by the market, which in
turn is conducive to the competitivity of firms.
3. Method and empirical model
3.1. Method
In order to study the policy effects, most of the existing literatures use the DID
model. The advantage of DID model is that the sample is divided into “treatment
group” and “control group” according to the time and object of policy action, so that
the policy effect can be evaluated. However, considering the following two reasons,
directly comparing the CETS pilot firms and non-CETS pilot firms as “treatment
group” and “control group” may lead to deviations in results. (1) the non-random-
ness of pilot selection of CETS cannot be ruled out. On the one hand, from the per-
spective of industries selected for CETS pilot, most of the industries constrained by
carbon emissions are high-carbon industries and sunset industries. On the other
hand, CETS pilot is mainly in the provinces and cities with representative degree of
regional economic development. It is generally believed that the higher the degree of
economic development, the more attention will be paid to energy conservation and
greenhouse gas emission mitigation (Zhang et al., 2017). (2) part of the difference
between CETS pilot and non-CETS pilot may be caused by other non-observable fac-
tors that do not change with time, resulting in the failure of the “treatment group”
and the “control group” to meet the common trend hypothesis of DID model, also
causes deviations in the empirical results.
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Based on this, the paper refers to method of L€oschel et al. (2019) using the PSM-
DID model for estimation. Firstly, we use the prosperity score match (PSM) to find
the “control group” similar with the CETS pilot firms to eliminate the selectivity of
sample, so that the “treatment group” and the “control group” have a common trend.
Then, the real policy effects of CETS are estimated with DID method, which can
ensure the accuracy of empirical results to a large extent. The matching process is
as follows.
First, the propensity scores of the “treatment group” and the “control group” were
estimated based on the Logit model. The aim is to reduce the multi-dimensional dif-
ferences between the “treatment group” and the “control group” individuals, in order
to facilitate the matching of subsequent tendency scores. As shown in formula (1):
PðXÞ ¼ PrðT ¼ 1jXÞ ¼ exp ðbX
0Þ
1þ exp ðbX0Þ (1)
where, X ¼ ðx01, x02, x03, . . . , x0nÞ0 is the control variable matrix, x0i is the i-th control
variable vector. Referring to existing research, we choose firm size (Size) and its
square term (Size2), age (Ages), asset-liability ratio (Leverage), ownership structure
(SOE) and ownership concentration (COCEN) as control variables. PðXÞ is the pro-
pensity score of the “treatment group” and the “control group” under the control
variable matrix X:
Second, the “treatment group” and the “control group” are matched or resampled
according to the matching method. The purpose is to calculate the distance or weight
between the “treatment group” and the “control group” sample by the propensity
score, and then find the counterfactual sample similar to the “treatment group” from
the “control group”. This paper uses the nearest neighbor matching method within
the caliper range. The specific process is shown in Equation (2):
Dðm, nÞ ¼ min
n
jP1iP0jj  e (2)
where P1i and P0j are the propensity scores of the i-th “treatment group” and the pro-
pensity score of the j-th “control group”, respectively, and e is a predetermined toler-
ance for matching or a caliper. In this paper, according to Rubin (1985), one-quarter
of the standard deviation of the propensity values of the sample estimates is used as
the caliper size (namely e  0:25r, where r is the standard deviation of the propen-
sity value of the sample estimate)
Third, a balanced test is performed on the matched samples. The aim is to ensure
that there is no significant statistical difference in covariates between the “treatment
group” and the “control group” after matching. Generally, it is examined by the
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where S21x and S
2
0x are the sample variances of the “treatment group” and “control
group” covariates x, respectively. It is generally required that this standardization gap
does not exceed 10%, and if it is exceeded, the second or first step is repeated until
there is no significant difference.
Finally, the matched samples are used for DID estimation. The purpose is to esti-
mate the impact of CETS on the firms’ innovation quality, on the basis of eliminating
the shortcomings of sample non-random selection.
3.2. Empirical model
Based on the above research method, in order to test the research hypothesis H1, the
model (4) is set in this paper. For the choice of the timing of the implementation of
the CETS, refer to the Zhang et al. (2017), with 2012 as the starting year for the pilot
implementation of the CETS.
INQi, j, k, t ¼ ai, j, k, t þ d  CETSi, j, k, t þ c  Controli, j, k, t þ Provj þ uk þ vt þ ei, j, k, t (4)
where the subscripts i, j, k, and t represent the firm, province, industry, and year,
respectively. INQi, j, k, t is the innovation quantity and innovation quality matrix.
CETSi, j, k, t is a 0-1 binary variable, when the sample is “treatment group”, then
CETSi, j, k, t ¼ 1, otherwise it is 0. Controli, j, k, t is the control variable matrix, including
firm size (Size) and its square term (Size2), business age (Ages), asset-liability ratio
(Leverage), ownership structure (SOE) and ownership concentration (COCEN).
Because the innovation quality varies greatly between different regions and different
industries, this paper also controls the individual effects of the industry, province and
time, namely uk, Provj and vt: ei, j, k, t represents a disturbance term. In addition, in
order to explore whether the CETS can promote the market value of firms and test
research hypotheses H2 and H3. This paper constructs a model (5) and a model (6).
MVi, j, k, t ¼ ai, j, k, t þ d  CETSi, j, k, t þ c  Controli, j, k, t þ Provj þ uk þ vt þ ei, j, k, t (5)
MVi, j, k, t ¼ ai, j, k, t þ d  CETSi, j, k, t  INQi, j, k, t1 þ b  INQi, j, k, t1 þ c  Controli, j, k, tþ
Provj þ uk þ vt þ ei, j, k, t
(6)
where MVi, j, k, t is the market value. At the same time, considering that the impact of
innovation on market value may take a certain amount of time, this paper uses a lag-
ging period of innovation quantity and innovation quality variables INQi, j, k, t1:
4. Data and variable
4.1. Data Source and processing
This paper takes all the A-share listed firms in China as the initial sample from 2006
to 2016. The patent application data comes from CSMAR database, and other
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financial indicators come from the Wind database. And we deal with the raw data
as follows.
1. Sample selection: In view of the CETS, it only covers eight pilot industries such
as petrochemical, chemical, building materials, steel, nonferrous metals, paper,
electricity and aviation. Therefore, the first-level sample selected in this paper
only covers these eight industries, and listed firms in seven pilot areas including
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangdong, Shenzhen and Hubei. as the
“treatment group”, and other samples as “control group”.
2. Missing value and outlier processing: Pre-extract samples with missing values of
control variables, but in order to ensure sufficient sample size, the missing data
of patent application, invention patent application, utility model patent applica-
tion, and design patent application is assigned a value of zero. At the same time,
in order to eliminate the influence of extreme values, Winsorize processing is
performed on 1% and 99% percentile of continuous variables. The following data
reports are based on the processed data results. In the end, a total of 588 listed
firms were included, with a total of 4497 observations.
4.2. Variable and definition
4.2.1. Innovation quality
Academics often measure the innovation quality based on patent information. For
example, Rong et al. (2017) use patent citations to measure the Chinese innovation
quality. Fisch et al. (2017) evaluate the quality of patents by using the time span
between the patent applications and its first citation. In order to ensure that the
innovation quality covers as much patent information as possible, some scholars use
principal component analysis (PCA) to synthesize the patents family scale, the
breadth of patent applications, patent forward citations and backward citations into
one indicator (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004; Schettino et al., 2013).
The above research on the firms’ innovation quality by patent characteristics pro-
vides useful inspiration for this paper. However, considering that the CNIPA does
not disclose citation data, the index of patent citation in China is only replaced by
variable, which is easily accessible to data, thus it maybe subjective. Moreover, at the
micro-firm level, it is difficult and laborious to identify each patent citation of each
firm. Based on this, we draw on Boeing (2016) patent applications as an innovation
indicator, and the application is closer to the time of invention, and it is also a sum-
mary of the current technology application and innovation. At the same time, accord-
ing to Hu and Jefferson (2009), Bronzini and Piselli (2016), Hu et al. (2017) and Hou
(2018), the patent application count (Patnet) is taken as the innovation quantity, and
then the innovation quality from high to low is represented by invention patent
application (Patenti), utility model patent application (Patentu) and design patent
application (Patentd), respectively. The actual basis for this innovative quality classifi-
cation comes from the classification of patents by the Chinese Patent Office. The
Chinese patent system grants three types of patents: invention, utility, and design pat-
ents. Among them, invention patents are of the highest novelty and technological
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inventiveness. To be granted, the application for an invention patents must meet the
requirement of “novelty, inventiveness, and practical applicability.” In contrast, utility
or design patents only require that a similar application has not previously
been granted.
4.2.2. Market value
The purpose of filing a patent is not only to protect the firms’ business, but also to
generate revenue from the commercialization process (Hsieh, 2013). Therefore, the
innovation quality depends to a large extent on whether the patents applied can help
firms gain competitive advantage in the market, and thus obtain excess profits.
Scholars often use patents market value to regress the patents to determine the value
of patents or the innovation quality (Bessen, 2009; Kim et al., 2018; Zhang et al.,
2014), and believe that the higher the innovation quality, the higher the firms’ market
value (Chen & Chang, 2010). This paper refers to the above research and uses
Tobin’s Q as an indicator of the firms’ market value.
4.2.3. Control variable
Many studies have shown that firm’s characteristics are also important variables
affecting the innovation quality. Based on this, we add six control variables, including
firm size and its square term, age, asset-liability ratio, ownership structure and own-
ership concentration. The firm size is expressed as the firm’s year-end sales. The age
(Ages) is expressed as the difference between 2016 and the year of establishment. The
asset-liability ratio (Leverage) is expressed as total liabilities/total assets. SOE is
expressed as a binary variable, if it contains state-owned shares, it is 1, otherwise it is
0. The degree of ownership concentration (COCEN) is expressed in the proportion of
the first largest shareholder (%). The variable definitions are shown in Table 1.
4.3. Descriptive statistics
Based on the above variables, we will focus on the statistical information of variables
such as innovation quantity (Patent), innovation quality (Patenti, Patentu and
Patend) and market value. As can be seen from Table 2, the mean of patent applica-
tions of 588 listed firms in China in 2006-2016 was 22.811. The mean of utility model
patent applications, invention patents and design patents are successively decreasing,
which are 10.99, 10.434 and 1.387 respectively. This is also consistent with the per-
formance of the maximum values of patents. It shows that the increase in the total
number of patents of listed firms mainly comes from invention patents and new util-
ity model patents. Further, this also indicates that firms are more inclined to apply
for patents with substantial innovation or micro-innovation. Looking at the statistical
information of market value, the mean of MV is 1.974, and the median is 1.414, indi-
cating that at least half of the firms have market value of more than 1. From the case
of the minimum and maximum values, they are 0.175 and 10.457, respectively, indi-
cating that the market value of the firms may have a large degree of deviation.
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5. Empirical result
5.1. Propensity score matching
Based on the introduction of the PSM-DID method mentioned above, this paper uses
the nearest neighbor matching method in caliper to match the samples of “treatment
group” and “control group” 1:1, in order to obtain the sub-samples for subsequent
empirical analysis.
Table 3 shows the results of the Logit model estimation. As we can see all variables
are significant at the 10% significance level, which indicating that China’s CETS pilots
are selected have certain non-randomness. It is worth noting that the coefficient of
the firm size is significantly negative, but its squared term (Size2) has a positive
impact on the implementation of the CETS. This is because the selection of pilot
firms in the CETS needs to meet certain conditions. For example, Hubei Province
only imposes firms with an annual energy consumption of more than 60,000 tons of
standard coal into carbon trading, and these are mostly large-scale firms. In addition,
the longer the business age (Ages), the easier it is to be selected as a CETS pilot firm,
while the coefficient of ownership (SOE) and equity concentration (COCEN) is nega-
tive. It shows that private firms with scattered equity are more likely to be con-
strained by carbon emissions than state-owned firms with high concentration
of ownership.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Patent 4497 22.811 74.291 0 1276
Patenti 4497 10.434 35.664 0 684
Patentu 4497 10.99 42.87 0 842
Patentd 4497 1.387 9.619 0 263
MV 4497 1.974 1.86 0.175 10.457
Size 4497 21.562 1.472 18 25.338
Size2 4497 467.084 64.408 324.013 642.034
Ages 4497 2.896 0.283 2.079 7.598
Leverage 4497 0.838 0.604 4.109 2.153
SOE 4497 0.522 0.5 0 1
COCEN 4497 3.502 0.474 2.142 4.377




Dependent variable LP ln(Patent þ 1)
LPi ln(Patenti þ 1)
LPu ln(Patentu þ 1)
LPd ln(Patentd þ 1)
MV Tobin’s Q
Control variable Size Year-end sales, take the natural logarithm
Size2 Squared item size
Ages 2016 minus the firm’s founding year, take the natural logarithm
Leverage Total liabilities/total assets
SOE The actual controller of the firm is the central and local SASAC,
government agencies, state-owned firm, the variable is 1,
otherwise 0
COCEN The proportion of the 1st largest shareholder (%), taken logarithm
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In order to verify the reliability of the matching results, this paper conducts a bal-
ance hypothesis test on the control variables of the matched samples. Table 4 shows
that before the trend score matching, expect for the average difference of Ages, the
mean difference of other variables is significant at the 5% level, but after the match-
ing operation, the mean difference of all variables between the “control group” and
the “treatment group” is no longer significant. This indicates that the matched sam-
ples passed the balance test, thus ensuring the reliability of subsequent empir-
ical results.
5.2. Induced effect test of environmental regulation
Firstly, the induced effect of environmental regulation model is regressed, and the
results are shown in Table 5. Among them, (1a) - (1d) is the regression result of pre-
matching sample DID, (2a) - (2d) is the regression result of post-matching PSM-
DID. It should be noted that in order to eliminate the sequence correlation and het-
eroscedasticity, the obtained results are more robust, and all the following regressions
are estimated by the FGLS method.
Compared with the regression results of DID and PSM-DID, the impact degree of
CETS on firms’ innovation is different, but the impact direction and significance are
consistent, which indicates that the regression results are robust, preliminarily. From
the coefficient size of CETS, the regression coefficients of PSM-DID are larger than
the regression coefficients of DID. Except for SOE, the absolute values of other con-
trol variable coefficients are smaller than the regression coefficients of DID, and the
saliency of all control variable coefficients is also reduced. In particular, the coeffi-
cient of COCEN is significantly changed from the original DID model to insignifi-
cant. It can be seen that the empirical results obtained by the PSM-DID regression
method are more robust. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis, only the regression
results of the PSM-DID method are explained.
In (2a) - (2d), the CETS has a positive impact on the patent applications count
and three types of patents (invention patents, utility model patents, and design pat-
ents), but the impact on design patents are not significant. This shows that the CETS
promotes technological innovation of firms and effectively induces firms to switch to
high-quality innovation. The reason comes from two aspects. On the one hand, under
strict environmental regulation, the original technology can no longer meet the needs
Table 3. PSM Logit regression results.
Variable Coefficient S.E. Z value P value
Size 3.101 0.545 5.690 0.000
Size2 0.0752 0.012 6.040 0.000
Ages 0.301 0.157 1.910 0.056
Leverage 0.376 0.072 5.230 0.000
SOE 0.256 0.088 2.900 0.004
COCEN 0.332 0.093 3.570 0.000
_cons 30.23 6.085 4.970 0.000
p< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1.
Pseudo R2¼0.0242, Wald Chi2¼ 100.95, Log pseudolikelihood=-1991.9191.
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of energy conservation and emission mitigation. Under the burden of increasing
“regulation costs”, firms have to carry out technological innovation (Hu et al., 2017).
At the same time, because technological innovation has positive externalities, once
technology is invented, it is difficult to exclude others from enjoying the benefits of
technological innovation for free, so that firms will seek intellectual property protec-
tion by applying for patents (Dang & Motohashi, 2015). On the other hand, the
CETS has greater flexibility as a market-based environmental regulation tool than
command-control environmental regulation tools. Under the constraint of carbon
emission, firms with higher technical level have stronger energy-saving and emission-
reducing effects, and by selling excess carbon allowances, they will obtain additional
profit, and thus firms are more willing to carry out higher-level innovation. This
proves the research hypothesis H1: the CETS not only promotes the increase in the
number of innovations, but also induces firms to turn to high-quality innovation.
In addition, the paper analyzes the impact of other control variables on the innov-
ation quantity and the innovation quality. The size of the firm has a significant nega-
tive impact on the patents count, invention patents and utility model patents, but its
secondary item Size2 has played a significant role in promoting. It shows that the
scale of the firm has a nonlinear impact on firm’s innovation. Although larger firm
has more abundant funds, they can obtain high-quality patents through purchase and
independent research and development (Gupeng & Xiangdong, 2012; Hu et al., 2017).
At the same time, however, economies of scale have shown that only firm that exceed
the threshold will have an amplification effect on firm’s innovation output (Tang,
2015). The business age (Ages) has a significant negative impact on the total number
of patents, invention patents and utility model patents, while the impact on design
patents is significantly positive. This may be because firm with long operating years
have basically formed a market structure. The cost of original innovation and micro-
innovation is huge. By attracting consumers through new designs that are aesthetic-
ally pleasing to the shape and pattern of products, the gains are even more consider-
able. The coefficient of asset-liability ratio (Leverage) is always negative, indicating
that the asset-liability ratio is too high, which is not conducive to firm innovation.
Table 4. PSM balance test.
Variable Sample
Control group Treatment group
Mean differenceN Mean N Mean
Size Unmatched 3738 21.5361 759 21.6891 0.1529
Matched 731 21.7868 731 21.6522 0.135
Size2 Unmatched 3738 465.83 759 473.2619 7.4319
Matched 731 477.1242 731 471.3855 5.739
Ages Unmatched 3738 2.8933 759 2.9102 0.017
Matched 731 2.8912 731 2.9072 0.016
Leverage Unmatched 3738 0.8212 759 0.9194 0.0982
Matched 731 0.9164 731 0.9169 0.001
SOE Unmatched 3738 0.53 759 0.4835 0.0464
Matched 731 0.487 731 0.4788 0.008
COCEN Unmatched 3738 3.5103 759 3.4603 0.0500
Matched 731 3.4888 731 3.4664 0.022
p< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1.
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The coefficient of ownership (SOE) is negative, indicating that firm with state-owned
shares significantly inhibited the application for patents by firm because Chinese
state-owned shares have market power and are more used to maintain market power
rather than technology innovation. It is worth noting that in the regression of the
design patent (2d), except for the significant coefficients of Ages and SOE, the other
variables are not significant. This may be because, as the most basic innovation, the
patented design technology is relatively low (Boeing, 2016), and there is no need to
submit reports and substantive review during the application process, which is more
of autonomous behavior (Huang, 2016).
5.3. Moderated effect test of environmental regulation
It is generally believed that the innovation quality is not only reflected in the com-
parison of the number of patents, but more importantly, whether technological
innovation can help firms gain competitive advantage and thus bring excess profits to
firms. Based on this, this paper makes a regression analysis on the impact of various
patents on market value. The specific results are shown in Table 6, in which (3) the
impact of CETS on market value (3a) - (3d) the impact of patents and the interaction
between patents and CETS on market value.
In the regression results (3), the CETS has a significant positive impact on market
value. This shows that CETS can directly enhance the competitivity or market value,
Table 6. Environmental regulation moderated effect regression results.
Variable
MV



















Constant 76.42 69.23 69.13 68.98 69.21
(11.11) (10.67) (10.65) (10.59) (10.70)
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1462 1350 1350 1350 1350
The parenthesis are the t valuesp< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1.
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but this is not consistent with most studies on the impact of environmental regula-
tion on the firms’ competitivity, or even a significant negative impact (L€oschel et al.,
2019; Zhao & Sun, 2016). This is because compared with the existing research on
China’s environmental regulation, this paper takes China’s CETS as a research per-
spective and focuses on the impact of carbon emission constraints on the competitiv-
ity of micro-firms. Moreover, it is generally believed that CETS is more flexible than
command-control environmental regulation tools and can promote the firms’ com-
petitivity. Although scholars have based on researches of EU ETS, and fund that EU
ETS cannot significantly enhance the firms’ competitivity. However, unlike the EU,
on the one hand, China is at a time of economic low-carbon transformation, and the
industrial structure is in a transitional transition from irrationality to rationality, and
there is still huge potential for green development. On the other hand, China has a
unified central government that makes the implementation of CETS policies more
efficient and thus easily transformed into the thrust of firms’ competitivity.
It can be seen from (3a) - (3d) that in all regression results, The patent variables
play a negative inhibitory role, but they are not significant at the 10% significance
level. This shows that in the product market, patents applied by Chinese firms cannot
be effectively converted into firms’ competitivity. Although China’s total number of
patent applications ranks first in the world (Huang, 2016), patents and technological
innovations and the link between patents and firms’ competitivity are becoming
weaker (Hu et al., 2017). Because firms are increasingly using patents as a marketing
strategy rather than producing products (Thoma, 2013), these non-innovative patents
create a waste of firms’ resources, which is not conducive to the firms’ competitivity.
In addition, during the “11th Five-Year Plan” period, China implemented a well-
known “innovation-driven” strategy. Local government will increase subsidies for
firms’ patent applications due to their political achievements, resulting in a surge in
the number of low-quality and invalid patent applications (Hu & Jefferson, 2009; Hu
et al., 2017). Thus, the research hypothesis H2 is validated: the impact of high-quality
innovation on firm competitivity is uncertain, and may be positive or negative.
Interestingly, although the patents are not conducive to the improvement of firms’
competitivity, the interaction between the patent and the CETS has a positive effect
on the firms’ competitivity, which means that the CETS can induce firms to apply for
patents with higher market value. Because when firms are constrained by carbon
emissions, the original technology is not enough to help firms offset the “regulation
costs” brought about by environmental regulation. For this reason, firms have to
switch to high-quality and energy-saving and emission reduction technology innov-
ation. It should be emphasized that when there are no carbon emission constraints,
this high-quality and energy-saving emission reduction technology will not only
improve the firms’ competitivity, but also cause productivity loss due to excessive
innovation (Hille & M€obius, 2019). In other words, the implementation of the CETS
can accelerate the recognition of high-quality innovations by the market, so that firms
can gain market power and thus bring excessive profits to the firms. This also verifies
the research hypothesis H3: The CETS plays a positive role in moderating techno-
logical innovation and competitivity, and can accelerate the recognition of high-qual-
ity innovation by the market, which in turn is conducive to competitivity.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 3323
6. Heterogeneity and robustness test
6.1. Heterogeneity test
The above empirical results show that differences in firm ownership will also have an
important impact on the innovation quality. Therefore, this paper divides the total
sample into state-owned shares firms and non-state-owned shares firms by including
whether the firm’s equity includes state-owned shares.
As shown in Table 7, in the return of carbon emission trading to the quality of
firm innovation, both state-owned and non-state-owned firms have promoted
innovation quantity (LP) and innovation quality (LPi, LPu, and LPd), but the
impact on the lowest quality innovation (LPd) is not significant at the 10% signifi-
cance level. From the perspective of the coefficient size, in addition to the coeffi-
cient of the LPd, the coefficient of the sample group of the state-owned share firms
is greater than that of the non-state-owned shares. This shows that compared with
non-state-owned joint-stock firms, the CETS has a stronger inducing effect on the
state-owned joint-stock firms turning to high-quality innovation.
Table 8 represents the Environmental regulation moderated effect regression
results. It can be seen from (6) and (7) in the table that the CETS has a significant
role in promoting the competitivity of state-owned joint-stock firms and non-state-
owned joint-stock firms, but the promotion effect on the competitivity of non-
state-owned firms is significantly greater. In the sample group of state-owned
shares, only the design patent application and its interaction with the CETS have a
significant impact on the market value, and the CETS can effectively regulate the
adverse effects of low-quality patents on market value and promote the role. In the
sample group of non-state-owned shares, innovation itself cannot promote the
value of firms, but the interaction between technological innovation and CETS has
a significant positive impact on market value. This shows that under the con-
straints of carbon emissions, the technological innovation of non-state-owned
joint-stock firms is more easily accepted by the market, and thus the competitivity
of firms is improved.
Table 7. Heterogeneity test: environmental regulation induced effect regression results.
Variable
State-owned shares firms Non-state-owned shares firms
LP LPi LPu LPd LP LPi LPu LPd
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (5a) (5b) (5c) (5d)
CETS 0.843 0.726 0.749 0.0333 0.540 0.298 0.507 0.0422
(5.18) (5.17) (5.02) (0.45) (3.25) (2.12) (3.37) (0.43)
Constant 20.99 21.54 18.05 0.579 10.66 8.498 7.449 3.509
(2.35) (2.80) (2.21) (-0.14) (-0.85) (-0.80) (0.65) (-0.47)
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 702 702 702 702 752 752 752 752
The parenthesis are the t values,p< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1.
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6.2. Robustness test
1. OLS robust standard error estimation
In order to eliminate missing variables that would vary due to individual differ-
ences, this paper based on the samples obtained by the aforementioned PSM
method, re-evaluated using OLS robust standard error, the results are shown in
Table 9. Compared with the above FGLS estimation results, in the OLS estima-
tion results, except for the CETS, the design patent application has not changed
significantly from the original to the significant, and the other variable coeffi-
cients have not changed significantly. This suggests that the choice of estimation
method will have some interference to the empirical results, but it is very limited.
2. Optimal propensity score matching method
The above empirical samples are obtained by using the nearest neighbor matching
method within the caliper range, but the subsamples obtained by the nearest neighbor
matching are related to the ordering of the processing group samples in the original
sample. That is, the ordering of the processing group samples in the original sample
changes, and the obtained sub-samples will also change, which will affect the empir-
ical results. In view of this, this paper is based on R software, using the optimal
(Optimal matching method), and the original sample is subjected to propensity score
matching in a ratio of 1:2, and then the regression analysis is performed on the
matched subsamples using stata12.0. The results are shown in Table 10. Compared
with the results obtained before, the robustness test results showed no significant
Table 9. OLS robust standard error regression results.
Variable
LP Lpi Lpu LPd
MV
(8a) (8b) (8c) (8d) (9) (9a) (9b) (9c) (9d)
CETS 0.799 0.577 0.709 0.0910 0.620

















Province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1462 1462 1462 1462 1462 1350 1350 1350 1350
R2 0.297 0.293 0.291 0.077 0.445 0.439 0.438 0.437 0.439
The parenthesis are the t values,p< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1.
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change in the significance and influence direction except for the slight change of the
regression coefficient. It can be seen that although the choice of the preference score
matching method has caused some interference to the empirical results, the degree is
limited, indicating that the empirical results in this paper are robust.
In addition, this paper also uses the following two methods for robustness testing.
Firstly, we delete the samples with zero patent application, perform the nearest neigh-
bor matching in the caliper again, and then repeat the steps of Tables 3–6, and obtain
a total of 1154 samples. The empirical results obtained are still consistent with those
in Tables 5–6, see Table 6 in the appendix, Supplementry material. Secondly, the
results obtained by replacing Tobin’s Q with Operating Margin are still robust, as
shown in Table 7 of the appendix, Supplementry material.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Based on the existing research on the “Porter Hypothesis”, this paper divides firms’
innovation into high-to-low innovation quality, according to the firms’ patent appli-
cation category (invention patent, utility model patent and design patent), and based
on theoretical analysis to propose research hypotheses. Finally, the research hypoth-
esis was tested using the 2006-2016 China A-share listed firm panel data and the
PSM-DID model. We get the following conclusions.
The CETS has a positive effect on the innovation quantity and the innovation
quality. In the baseline model, the CETS has a positive impact on the patents count
and three types of patents (invention patents, utility model patents, and design pat-
ents), but the impact on design patents is not significant. It shows that the CETS can
induce high-quality innovation of firms, and thus answer the basic question of
whether the CETS can force firms to switch to high-quality innovation. The reason is
that under the constraint of carbon emission, the original technology has been unable
to meet the requirements of energy conservation and emission reduction. In order to
alleviate the increasing burden of “regulation cost”, firms will carry out technological
innovation (Hu et al., 2017). However, from the perspective of the degree of influ-
ence, the impact of the CETS on the total number of patents, utility model patents
and invention patents are decreasing. This shows that, for the moment, Chinese firms
have not really got rid of the traditional innovation strategy of patent-based quantita-
tive. The reasons are mainly from two aspects. On the one hand, considering the
technology spillover effect, compared with the original technology innovation, appro-
priate application technology innovation within the existing technology framework
can not only avoid the uncertainty risks brought by the original technology innov-
ation, but also enable firms to enjoy the “innovation compensation” brought by the
application innovation faster. In addition, giving full play to the economies of scale of
firms and increasing the reform of state-owned firms are also important driving
forces for improving the innovation quality.
Patents cannot improve the firms’ competitivity, but the CETS can accelerate the
market identification of innovation. Firstly, the CETS has a significant positive impact
on market value indicating that the CETS, as a more flexible environmental regula-
tion tool, can promote the firms’ competitivity, thus also verifying the narrow version
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“Porter Hypothesis”. It is generally believed that market-based environmental regula-
tory tools give firms greater flexibility to reduce pollution (Johnstone et al., 2017; Ren
et al., 2018; Tang, 2015). In the carbon emission market, firms can obtain excess
returns by selling excess carbon allowances, or they can reduce penalties and increase
production income by buying carbon allowances. Secondly, no matter how the innov-
ation quality cannot improve the firms’ competitivity, it shows that most patents
applied by Chinese firms cannot be effectively translated into real profits. As men-
tioned above, It is generally believed that the quality of innovation is positively corre-
lated with corporate value, but high-quality innovation may not necessarily bring
high returns to the firm due to market failures (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004).
Especially when the market environment has not changed significantly, if the techno-
logical innovation of the firms is too advanced, it will not only not be recognized by
the market, but also cause the loss of competitiveness due to the waste of resources
(Hsieh, 2013). In other words, high-quality innovation cannot be automatically recog-
nized by the market. Finally, the interaction between patents and CETS has a positive
role in promoting the firms’ competitivity. This means that CETS can induce firms to
apply for patents with high market value. In other words, CETS can accelerate the
market’s identification of innovation. This is because, on the one hand, technological
innovation can reduce the cost burden brought by carbon emission constraints; on
the other hand, the implementation of CETS has changed the market environment
that did not pay attention to environmental protection in the past, so that high-qual-
ity innovation can be recognized and accepted by the market. Thus, it answers the
question of whether the firms’ strategy of switching to high-quality innovation can
enhance the competitivity.
Differences in firm ownership will also have a greater impact on the inducing
effect and moderating effect of CETS. The CETS has a significant role in promoting
the innovation quantity (patent application count) and the innovation quality (inven-
tion patent application and utility model patent application) for both state-owned
and non-state-owned firms, but it has a stronger inducement for state-owned joint-
stock firms to turn to high-quality innovation. From the perspective of the impact of
CETS and technological innovation on firm competitivity, the CETS has a significant
role in promoting the competitivity of state-owned joint-stock firms and non-state-
owned joint-stock firms, but it has a stronger role in promoting the competitivity of
non-state-owned firms.
This paper may have some limitations are as followed. Firstly, on the sample selec-
tion. This paper only uses A-share listed firms as a research sample. Although it helps
to obtain sufficient and reliable data and has a strong persuasive force, it may cause
some sample selection biased because non-listed firms are not considered. In the
future, you can consider expanding the sample size or using a sample of non-listed
firms to conduct related research. Secondly, on the identification of innovation qual-
ity. This paper only classifies the innovation quality based on the type of patent appli-
cation. Although it can also reflect the quality of innovation to a certain extent, it is
still not comprehensive. In the future, we will consider collecting more detailed patent
information to deepen subsequent research. Thirdly, on firm’s competitivity. This
paper mainly uses Tobin’s Q as an indicator of the firms’ market competitivity, and
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also uses operating margin as a substitute indicator in the robustness test. To a cer-
tain extent, the robustness of the empirical results is guaranteed, but it is still insuffi-
cient for the firms’ competitivity. In the future, the impact of CETS on firms’
productivity can be further considered.
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